

**CIRCUIT AND METHOD FOR THE SECURING OF A COPROCESSOR  
DEDICATED TO CRYPTOGRAPHY**

**Field of the Invention**

The present invention relates to  
cryptography, and, more particularly, the invention  
relates to a circuit and a method for securing the  
5 loading of a digital key and/or message to be encrypted  
or decrypted.

## **Background of the Invention**

The field of the invention is cryptology.

Cryptology can be defined as the science of concealing information. It is, along with the physical security of the components and of exploiting systems, a critical characteristic of chip card security.

Cryptology encompasses both cryptography, which is the art of encrypting and decrypting messages, and cryptanalysis which is the art of breaking secret codes. The encryption of messages includes the conversion of information by a secret convention. The conversion function constitutes the cryptographic algorithm whose secret lies in parameters known as keys. The reverse operation, which is the decrypting of the message, requires a knowledge of these keys.

In chip cards, cryptography implements various mechanisms aimed at ensuring either the

confidentiality of the information or the authentication of the cards or users or again the signature of the messages. All the means implementing cryptography form a cryptography system.

5       Figure 1 is a simplified diagram of a typical cryptography system. In this figure, a non-encrypted message is transmitted from a transmission unit 1 to a reception unit 2 in the form of an encrypted message. In the transmission unit 1, the non-encrypted message  
10 is converted by an algorithm A which is a function of an encryption key C1. In the reception unit 2, the information received is decrypted by a reverse algorithm A<sup>-1</sup> which uses a decryption key C2 in order to recover the non-encrypted message. In this specific  
15 case, i.e. when an encryption and decryption algorithm is used, the encryption key and the decryption key are identical. A message can thus be transmitted between a sending unit and a reception unit on an unsecured channel. Only an authorized user holding the secret  
20 decryption key can decode the encrypted message.

      The decryption operation implies that the encryption algorithm is a reversible algorithm. This condition is not necessary for example during an authentication operation. Indeed, certain  
25 authentication mechanisms use one and the same algorithm at both the sending and the reception of a message. The choice of an encryption algorithm for a chip card depends on the type of security service expected, the performance and above all the cost of the  
30 resources needed to install this algorithm. This cost depends on the size of the RAM and ROM type memories.

      Indeed, the use of bulky algorithms very quickly increases the price of chip cards. An encryption algorithm widely used in chip cards is the  
35 DES (Data Encryption System) algorithm according to the

ISO/ANSI standard. An algorithm of this kind requires two data inputs (the encryption or decryption key and the information to be encrypted or decrypted) and produces a piece of output data (the result of the 5 processing by the algorithm). The size of the signals coming from the encryption algorithm is generally 64 bits. The non-encrypted message may be converted into an encrypted message of the same length or of a different length, for example by combining data blocks, 10 stringing them and thus enabling identical data blocks to be encrypted differently.

There are symmetrical cryptography systems: these are cryptography systems making use of encryption and decryption algorithms whose encryption and decryption keys are identical. When the encryption and decryption keys are different, the cryptography system is called asymmetrical. Other cryptography systems exist, especially cryptography systems with zero knowledge input.

20 Symmetrical algorithms raise problems of key management. Indeed, when a large number of users forms part of a network, each of them should have a personalized key since one key for all would endanger the whole system if it ever got compromised. Since it  
25 is impractical and risky to store all the keys, the method lies in diversifying them by a master key and an identifier for each card. The master keys need to be particularly well protected and may be contained in a security module or a card known as a mother card  
30 possessed by the sender of the cards.

Figure 2 illustrates an exemplary dynamic verification of the validity of an operation for decrypting a digital message transmitted in encrypted form. In this figure, a random number  $NA$  is encrypted by an encryption algorithm  $A$  that brings an encryption

key C1 into operation. An encrypted message MC thus created is transmitted to a chip card 20. A microcomputer 21 of the chip card 20 decrypts the encrypted message by a reverse decryption algorithm  $A^{-1}$  5 and a decryption key C2 which, in practice, is identical to the encryption key C1. A number R is the result of this decryption operation. A test module 22 makes it possible to retrieve the number R and compare it with the initially sent number NA. The chip card 10 20, which has performed the operation of decrypting the encrypted message MC, is considered to be authentic if the number NA is equal to the number R. Only an authentic card is capable of retrieving the number NA by using its secret key.

15 The digital keys used by the electronic components to encrypt or decrypt messages, especially in chip card microcomputers, are therefore essential for the confidentiality of the data elements conveyed. Anybody possessing the digital key associated with an 20 encryption algorithm or decryption algorithm can access data not intended for him or her.

The conventional system that uses these digital keys still has a few weaknesses in terms of achieving security, for example during the loading of a 25 digital key used for the encryption or decryption of a digital message. An example of such a situation is given in Figure 3. Figure 3 shows an electronic circuit 3 loading an encryption or decryption digital key into the registers of a coprocessor dedicated to 30 cryptography.

In Figure 3, a memory module 30 is connected to a battery of input/output registers 32 by a two-way link 31. The battery of input/output registers 32 include elementary registers which, for example, have a 35 memory capacity of one eight-bit byte (hereinafter, in

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the present document, the term "byte" shall be defined as an eight-bit byte). A multiplexer 34 distributes the data contained in the battery of input/output registers 32 between elementary registers of an input 5 register 36 and a key register 38. A control module 40 manages all the operations performed by the memory module 30, the battery of input/output registers 32 and the multiplexer 34. The control module 40 furthermore ensures that the data elements to be encrypted or 10 decrypted sent by the memory module 30 are transmitted into the input register 36 by a first communication bus B1 and that the data relative to the digital key is transmitted into the key register 38 by a second communications bus B2.

15 There are several possible types of operation for the transmission of data from the battery of input/output registers 32 to the input register 36 and the key register 38. A first mode of transmission may be the following: all the elementary registers of the 20 battery of input/output registers 32 are filled with data elements coming from the memory module 30. Only then is the totality of the information contained in the battery of input/output registers 32 transmitted into each of the appropriate elementary registers of 25 the input register 36 or, as the case may be, into each of the appropriate elementary registers of the key register 38.

Another possible mode of transmission is the following one: whenever a register of the battery of 30 input/output registers is loaded from the memory module 30, it is immediately transmitted through the multiplexer 34 to an appropriate elementary register of the input register 36 or the key register 38. In any case, a processing module 42 working by an encryption 35 or decryption algorithm requires all the data,

pertaining to the message to be processed, that is contained in the input register 36 and all the data, pertaining to the digital key, that is contained in the key register 38. The working of the processing module 5 is also managed by the control unit 40.

The message to be processed and the digital key are transmitted to the processing module 42 respectively from the input register 36 and from the key register 38, respectively by a link 41 and a link 10 43. With all these data elements, the processing module 42 is capable of transmitting a message processed into an output register 44 by means of a link 45. The data elements contained in the output register 44 can then be transmitted to the memory module 30 15 through the multiplexer 34, the battery of input/output registers 32 and a third communications bus B3 which exchanges data between the output register 44 and the multiplexer 34.

A circuit of the kind described in Figure 3 20 poses a problem of external visibility. Indeed, a measurement of the electrical signals revealing information exchanges between different parts of the circuit could enable access to confidential information that plays a role in the protection of data by the 25 encryption or decryption system.

Indeed, when the digital key is being used by a certified component (such as a chip card), the digital key could become visible to a certain degree through the study of such electrical signals. The 30 sensitive electrical signals may be observed on electrical links or communication buses, especially between the memory module 30 and the battery of input/output registers 32, as well as between the battery of input/output registers 32 and the 35 multiplexer 34, between the multiplexer 34 and the

different input registers 36, key registers 38 and output registers 44 or again between the different input and output registers and the processing module 42.

5           The digital key may thus be discovered as a result of an accumulation of measurements of the electrical signals referred to here above and a statistical study of these measurements. The component may for example use the digital key in the situation

10          shown in Figure 3. For example, in the case where the component performs an encryption operation, to perform an operation of this kind, the component needs to load the encryption key from an internal memory module. It may thus be authenticated as being a legitimate

15          component entitled to perform the operation. Thus, if the component is observed when it is known to be performing an operation to load the key, then it is possible, by recording the information conveyed by the electrical signals brought into play, to arrive at

20          knowledge on the digital encryption key. Once this key is known, it is very easy to reproduce the behavior of the legitimate component and subsequently perform operations initially prohibited to some user or another.

25          Another exemplary case may pose a problem on the visibility of the information flowing in the form of electrical signals. Indeed, apart from information on the digital key, it is also possible, by the study of certain electrical signals, especially between the

30          output of the processing module and the memory module, to know the processed result recovered by the component in its memory module. The knowledge of only the encryption or decryption result, possibly in association with the knowledge of the original message

35          to be encrypted or decrypted, may be enough to thwart

the security provided by the confidentiality of a digital key. Indeed, it is enough to send a component the processed result expected as a function of the initial message to enable the performance of operations 5 that were not authorized at the outset.

**Summary of the Invention**

It is an object of the present invention to overcome the problems that have just been described. To this end, the invention provides an electronic 10 circuit for the securing of a coprocessor dedicated to cryptography that ensures the non-visibility, with respect to a study of electrical signals during data transfers, of the digital key or of the result of an encryption or decryption operation.

15 To achieve these goals, the invention includes the use of an additional register, called a scrambling register, in the battery of input/output registers 32 of the circuit described in Figure 3. This additional register is filled by what are called 20 scrambling bits, randomly at instants also chosen randomly during the loading of the digital key into the battery of input/output registers. A random factor is thus introduced. This random factor enables the elimination of a part of the visibility, to the outside 25 world, of the behavior of the component and therefore of the data elements that it is processing. An analysis of the electrical signals associated with the data elements being processed can no longer be effective in obtaining possession of confidential 30 information.

The loading of the scrambling register is a dummy operation that has no effect on the loading of the data essential to the operation of the encryption

or decryption operations. The loading of very highly sensitive data is thus secured.

The invention relates to an electronic circuit for the securing of a coprocessor dedicated to 5 cryptography comprising a memory module, a battery of input/output registers connected to the memory module by a two-way link, and a multiplexer to carry out a transfer of data between the battery of input/output registers and an input register or a key register. The 10 input register and the key register respectively receive the data elements of a message to be processed by an encryption or decryption operation and the data elements of an encryption or decryption digital key.

The circuit also includes a processing module 15 to perform an encryption or decryption operation accepting, at a first input, the messages to be processed contained in the input register and, at a second input, the digital key contained in the key register to process the message to be processed. Also, 20 a control module is included to manage the operations performed by the memory module, the battery of input/output registers, the multiplexer and the processing module. Furthermore, the circuit has an output register to transmit the result of an encryption 25 or decryption operation to the battery of input/output registers through the multiplexer. The battery of input/output registers comprises a scrambling register to receive scrambling bits foreign to the message to be encrypted or decrypted and/or to the digital key.

30 According to one embodiment of the invention, the circuit includes an accessory input register connected to the processing module and to the multiplexer to receive the scrambling bits sent directly by the processing module or coming from the 35 memory module. The phrase "scrambling bits coming from

the memory module" is understood to mean the scrambling bits could have been transmitted to other elements of the circuit before reaching the accessory input register.

5 According to one particular embodiment, the circuit according to the invention includes the scrambling bits being generated randomly by the memory module or the processing module. In the preferred applications of the invention, the scrambling bits are  
10 produced in the form of eight-bit bytes.

Another object of the invention is to provide a method for the securing of a coprocessor dedicated to cryptography comprising the steps of: transmitting data by a two-way link from a memory module to a battery of 15 input/output registers, transmitting, through a multiplexer, from the battery of input/output registers respectively to an input register and to a key register, respectively data corresponding to a message to be processed by an encryption or decryption 20 operation and data corresponding to an encryption or decryption digital key, and processing the message to be processed by a processing module accepting, at a first input, the data elements coming from the input register and, at a second input, the data elements 25 coming from the key register and giving the data elements corresponding to the processed message to the output register. The method according to the invention also includes the step of the transmission, to a scrambling register of the battery of input/output 30 registers, of the scrambling bits foreign to the message to be processed and the transmission, to the digital key, of the scrambling bits being sent directly by the memory module or coming from the processing module.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the scrambling bits are transmitted into an accessory register connected to the processing module and to the multiplexer to receive the scrambling bits sent

5 directly by the processing module or coming from the memory module. According to a particular application of the method according to the invention, the scrambling bits are transmitted randomly. According to another particular embodiment of the method according

10 to the invention, scrambling bits are sent to the scrambling register whenever a digital key is loaded into the battery of input/output registers.

**Brief Description of the Drawings**

The different aspects and advantages of the invention shall appear more clearly from the following description, made with reference to the appended drawings, which are given purely by way of non-limiting examples of the invention, and are introduced here below:

20 Figure 1 is a simplified diagram of a conventional cryptography system;

Figure 2 illustrates a conventional example of dynamic verification of the validity of the encryption of a message transmitted after encryption;

25 Figure 3 illustrates a conventional electronic circuit loading a digital key into the registers of a coprocessor dedicated to the encryption of data elements; and

Figure 4 illustrates an electronic circuit according to the invention obtaining the secured loading of a digital key into the registers of a coprocessor dedicated to cryptography.

**Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiments**

Figure 4 shows the same elements as in the electronic circuit described in Figure 3: a memory module 30, a battery of input/output registers 32, a 5 multiplexer 34, an input register 36, a key register 38, a control module 40, a processing module 42, and an output register 44. The figure also shows the same electrical links or communication buses as in the circuit described with reference to Figure 3.

10 The circuit according to the invention can be distinguished from the prior art circuit shown in Figure 3, by the presence of an additional register 50, called a scrambling register, in the battery of input/output registers. Unlike the other registers of 15 the battery of input/output registers, the scrambling register 50 is not designed to receive data elements pertaining to the message to be processed or to the digital key. The scrambling register 50 is designed to receive a certain number of bits called scrambling bits 20 that are designed to secure the loading of a digital key or a processed message into the battery of input/output registers 32.

In one particular embodiment of the invention, the scrambling register 50 may contain eight 25 bits. Its size therefore is one byte. This example however is not restrictive and the size of the scrambling register 50 may differ according to the embodiments of the circuit according to the invention. For the sake of simplicity, the description shall 30 hereinafter be limited to the case where the scrambling register 50 has the size of one byte. A two-way link 52 transfers data between the scrambling register 50 and the multiplexer 34.

According to a preferred embodiment of the 35 invention, an accessory input register 54 is connected

firstly to the multiplexer 34, by a two-way link 56, and secondly to the encryption module 42, by a two-way link 58. Preferably, the accessory input register 54 has the same size as the scrambling register 50. The 5 accessory register 54 is indeed designed to receive or send scrambling bits from or to the scrambling register 50. However there is no major drawback if the accessory input register 54 has a size different from that of the scrambling register 50.

10 The operation of the circuit according to one particular embodiment of the invention is as follows. The memory module 30 loads a certain number of bits in the form of bytes into the elementary register of the battery of input/output registers 32. These bytes 15 correspond either to a message to be processed or to the digital key. When the digital key is loaded from the memory 30 into the input/output battery 32, scrambling bits are sent randomly on the link 31. The scrambling bits are then oriented to the scrambling 20 register 50 according to different operational modes explained here above. The scrambling bits, like the other data elements, may be transmitted by bytes.

A random number of scrambling bytes is therefore sent between two bytes carrying information 25 on the digital key. Should the digital key have a size of 8 bytes, a scrambling byte may be transmitted between any two bytes encoding the digital key. A scrambling byte may also be transmitted before the first byte encoding the digital key or again after the 30 last byte encoding the digital key. Furthermore, a random number of scrambling bytes may be sent during one and the same loading of a digital key. In this example, each scrambling byte sent is always oriented towards the scrambling register 50, and each new

scrambling byte sent erases the previous scrambling byte kept in the scrambling register 50.

This is also the case for the scrambling bytes coming from the processing module 42 and received 5 by the accessory input register 54. Thus, a person who tries to obtain the digital key fraudulently by the study of the electrical signals sent by the two-way link 31 is doomed to failure. Indeed, the electrical signals corresponding to the sending of the scrambling 10 bytes will distort the statistical studies that would have led to the discovery of the digital key.

The two-way link 52 transfers data between the scrambling register 50 and the multiplexer 34 in such a way that a study of the electrical signals 15 between the battery of input/output registers 32 and the multiplexer 34, with a view to finding the digital key, is also doomed to failure. At output of the multiplexer 34, the control module 40 orients the data elements coming from the scrambling register 50 to the 20 accessory input register 54 by the two-way link 56. This two-way link may be of the type formed by the buses described here above.

Just as the register 36 and the key register 38 may have a size similar to that of the register of 25 the battery of input/output registers 32, it is enough for the accessory input register 54 to be of the minimum size needed to receive the data elements coming from the scrambling register 50. The two-way link 56 herein also ensures that any statistical study of the 30 electrical signals exchanged between the multiplexer 34 and the input register 36 and key register 38 will be disturbed. In the same way, the study of the electrical signals between the input register 36 and the key register 38 is disturbed by the electrical 35 signals conveyed by the two-way link 58 between the

accessory input register 54 and the processing module 42.

In the preferred embodiment of the invention, the accessory input register 54 has an address close to 5 the addresses of the input register 36 or of the key register 38. A person studying the electrical signals exchanged on the different buses thus cannot perceive any obvious difference when the addresses of the addressee registers are conveyed. When the processing 10 module 42 produces the encrypted message that it stores in the output register 44 by the link 45, it produces scrambling bits randomly and not necessarily for each encrypted operation. These scrambling bits are stored in the accessory input register 54 by the two-way link 15 58. The new scrambling bits are also transmitted through the multiplexer 34 to the battery of input/output registers 50 simultaneously with the transmission of the data elements contained in the output register 44 to the input/output register 32 20 through the multiplexer 34.

A piece of electrical scrambling information is thus present during the loading, into the memory module 30, of the result of the encryption or decryption operation. Thus, a person who might have 25 knowledge of the message to be encrypted cannot obtain knowledge of the encryption result by a statistical study of the electrical signals conveyed on the different links that come into action.

The securing circuit and method according to 30 the invention can be used for any encryption and decryption operation. The circuit and the method according to the invention therefore use an electrical scrambling signal for all sensitive data transfers needed to carry out an encryption or decryption 35 operation with a digital key.

The circuit and the method according to the invention make advantageous use of the fact that the operations performed within a battery of registers are far less accessible than the electrical information 5 elements present between the battery of registers and various elements of the circuit.